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Abstract 
Günther Anders (1902-1992) was an Austrian philosopher, critical theorist, political activist, 
and a writer of poems, short stories and novels. His works on the critical theory of technology 
have remained rather undiscovered. His main work Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (The 
Antiquatedness of the Human Being) appeared in two volumes and has thus far not been 
published in English. This essay reviews key aspects of Anders’ works and uses them to 
critically assess big data capitalism. It first discusses Anders’ concept of the Promethean 
gap; the gap between what humans can produce with the help of technologies and the 
capacity of imagining the negative effects these technologies can have. The essay also 
engages with Anders’ analysis of commercial television and radio. Anders sees capitalism as 
having catastrophic potentials. He argues that Auschwitz and Hiroshima are two symbols of 
20th-century catastrophism. The article discusses Anders’ letter to Klaus Eichmann, the son 
of Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of the organisation of the displacement and 
deportation of Jews in the Third Reich. It furthermore analyses the exchange of letters 
between Anders and Claude Eatherly, the pilot of an aircraft that supported dropping the 
nuclear bomb “Little Boy” on Hiroshima. Finally, the paper engages with Anders’ critique of 
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. In the age of the Internet and big data capitalism, Anders’ 
warnings about the potential negative effects of capitalist technologies and capitalism remain 
of crucial relevance and have taken on new qualities. Anders’ philosophy is an undiscovered 
critical theory of technology that allows us to critically understand power structures in the age 
of big data and social media. 
Keywords: Günther Anders, critical theory, philosophy of technology, Internet, big data 
capitalism, social media, Promethean gap, ideology, antiquatedness of the human being, 
outdatedness, obsolescence, Martin Heidegger  
 
Günther Anders and Hannah Arendt. Source: posted on Flickr as CC by acido 
nucleio, https://www.flickr.com/photos/guntheranders/4248063814  
 
tripleC 15(2): 584-613, 2017 585 
 




Günther Anders (1902-1992) was an Austrian philosopher, critical theorist, political 
activist, and a writer of poems, short stories, novels, letters,diaries, and short stories. 
He studied art, history and philosophy in Hamburg, Freiburg and Marburg. His 
teachers included Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Cassirer. He 
defended his dissertation in 1923 at the University of Freiburg. Husserl was his PhD 
supervisor. Just like Herbert Marcuse, Anders turned against his former teacher 
Martin Heidegger because of the latter’s role in the Nazi regime (for a comparison of 
Anders’ and Marcuse’s works, see Fuchs 2002). Anders published texts against 
Heidegger, arguing that his former teacher’s philosophy was pseudo-concrete. 
Anders was married to Hannah Arendt from 1929 until 1937.  
As a son of Jewish parents, Anders, like his second cousin Walter Benjamin, had 
to flee from Germany after Hitler had come to power in 1933. He went first to Paris 
and then to the USA. The rise of Hitler, Auschwitz, and the dropping of atom bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were politically formative events for Anders that he 
reflected in his writings. In 1950, Anders and his then-wife Elisabeth Freundlich 
returned to Europe. They married and settled in Vienna where he lived until his death 
in 1992. 
In distinction to the Frankfurt School critical theorists, Anders explicitly called 
himself a critical theorist of technology. In his principal work Die Antiquiertheit des 
Menschen, he studied the transformations of the soul in the age of the second 
industrial revolution. The German version of the two-volume work consists of 818 
pages. The book has until this day not been published in English. The title can be 
translated as The Antiquatedness of the Human Being, The Outdatedness of the 
Human Being, or The Obsolescence of the Human Being.  
Anders (1980a, 9) characterises his approach explicitly as “philosophy of 
technology”. Other critical theorists, such as Herbert Marcuse, also wrote about 
technology, but did not devote entire books to such analysis and did not define their 
approaches as critical theory of technology. So Anders’ approach is special in that he 
devoted a lot of attention to the critical analysis of technology’s role in society. 
Anders argued that there are contradictions in society that shape technology and its 
use (Ibid. 126). He opposed the blind belief in technological progress as well as 
scepticism towards all technology. A dialectical philosophy of technology has “to 
discover and determine the dialectical point at which our ‘yes’ to technology has been 
transformed into scepticism or into a straightforward ‘no’”1 (Anders 1980b).  
Günther Anders’ “genuine interest in different aspects of what he analyses as a 
global issue of power abuse and repression […] established him as a transnational 
intellectual” (Molden 2014, 69). Konrad Paul Liessmann characterises Anders as 
philosophy’s outsider: Anders was a truly interdisciplinary thinker, who wrote “poems, 
novels, fables and tales as well as philosophical essays and treatises” (Liessmann 
2014, 73). Transcendence was a key feature of Anders’ works, as he “did not want to 
commit himself: neither to a provenance, nor to a future; neither to a style, nor to a 
genre; neither to a philosophical school, nor to an ideology; neither to an institution, 
nor to an identity; neither to a discipline, nor to a category” (Liessmann 2014, 73). 
Anders (1956, 8) characterises his philosophy as occasional philosophy: It takes 
political and other events as occasions for philosophical intervention. Exaggeration is 
one of his philosophical methods (1956, 15). Anders (1980a, 411-414) says that his 
                                            
1 „den dialektischen Punkt ausfindig zu machen und zu bestimmen, wo sich unser Ja der 
Technik gegenüber in Skepsis oder in ein unverblümtes Nein zu verwandeln hat“ (Anders 
1980a, 127).  
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writings do not form a system and that Hegel worked out the last systematic 
philosophy. Because of a lack of translation of his works into English, Günther 
Anders remains one of the undiscovered critical theorists of society and technology. 
This essay is an introduction to Anders’ main works. It asks: How did Günther Anders 
analyse modern technology? In which respects does his thought remain relevant in 
digital capitalism? 
The paper proceeds by discussing the relevance of Anders’ concept of the 
Promethean gap (section 2), his analysis of broadcasting (section 3), Auschwitz and 
Hiroshima as modern catastrophes (section 4), and his criticism of Martin 
Heidegger’s philosophy (section 5).  
2. The Promethean Gap 
Günther Anders argues that contemporary society is a system of machines: “The 
machine system is our ‘world’”2 (Anders 1956, 2). In this world, we encounter what he 
(Ibid., 16) terms the Promethean gap, an asynchronicity of humans and products. 
The Promethean gap entails gaps between the relations of production and ideology, 
production and imagination, doing and feeling, knowledge and conscience, the 
machine and the body (Ibid., 18), production and needs (Ibid., 19). We are unable to 
imagine the vast negative consequences that contemporary technologies’ uses can 
bring about. In the case of catastrophes induced by technologies, we are unable to 
show grief and remorse because the number of deaths and the extent and intensity 
of devastation are so excessive.  
2.1. Prometheus 
The Greek myth of Prometheus appears in Theogony (Hesiod 2006), which is a 
poem by Hesiod, who lived around the time of the 8th and 7th century BC. 
Prometheus challenges Zeus’ power by tricking him into choosing an inferior gift that 
looks like a superior one. He furthermore steals fire from Mount Olympus and gives it 
to the humans. Zeus, the king of the gods, unleashes his anger against Prometheus 
by eternal punishment. Prometheus is chained to a rock and every day an eagle eats 
up his liver. The liver is restored overnight so that the whole procedure repeats itself 
daily. Finally, Heracles frees Prometheus. In this myth, Prometheus gives fire to the 
humans as a means of production because he thinks it emancipates them. But Zeus’ 
wrath is more powerful than Prometheus, whose deed is eternally punished. The 
attempt of emancipation ends up in suffering, failure and domination. Anders applied 
the myth of Prometheus as an allegory of modern technology that was first created 
for emancipating humanity from scarcity and hardship, but has unleashed new 
destructive powers. We can think of the fire in the Prometheus myth as a symbol of 
technological progress, while Prometheus’ eternal punishment is equivalent to 
technology and society’s negative dialectic that turns against progress and has 
negative impacts.  
The Promethean gap means a “confusion of creator and creation”3 (Anders 2016, 
31 [German: Anders 1956, 25]). When “feeling ‘Promethean shame’ humans also 
prefer what was made over the maker”4 (Anders 2016, 31 [G: Anders 1956, 25]). 
Taking up Marx’s notion of alienation and Lukács’ concept of reification, Anders 
argues that there are three stages of reification:  
                                            
2 Translation from German: „Das Gerätesystem ist unsere‚ Welt’“.  
3 Translation from German: „Vertauschung von Macher und Gemachtem“. 
4 In German original: „auch in seiner ‚promethischen Scham’ zieht der Mensch ja das 
Gemachte dem Macher vor“. 
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1. The loss of human control of the means of production;  
2. “Thing-shame”, the human feeling of “shame at not being a thing”5 (Anders 2016, 
35 [G: 1956, 30]); 
3. Humans’ feelings of inferiority to the machine, the “self-degradation in front of 
fabricated things”6 (Anders 2016, 35 [G: 1956, 30]).  
When Anders says that humans desert to the camp of the machines (2016, 36 [G: 
1956, 31]), he means that ideology “inverts the relation between freedom and 
unfreedom”7 (2016, 38 [G: 1956, 33]). Humans who adhere to this ideology think that 
things “are free and human beings are unfree”8 (2016, 38 [G: 1956, 33]). 
2.2. Technological Fetishism 
As an example of technological fetishism, Anders (2016, 58-62 [G: 1956, 59-64]) tells 
the story of Douglas MacArthur who was UN commander in the Korean War. 
MacArthur fed data into a computer in order to calculate whether the US should 
intervene in Korea or not. As all computers used for instrumental reasons, the 
machine was exclusively fed “with the type of data that did not offer any resistance to 
quantification”9 (2016, 59 [G: 1956, 61]). Data and computing cannot make moral 
judgements because only humans have moral capacities. Questions about “the 
annihilation of human lives or the devastation of countries” were reduced to “figures 
of profit or loss”10 (2016, 60; [G: 1956, 61]) – moral qualities were reduced to 
calculable quantities. A key decision about life and death was left to a machine.  
In Capital Volume 1 (1867), Marx describes in the chapter Machinery and Large 
Scale Industry (see Fuchs 2016, chapter 15) how capitalist technology’s rise was 
associated with an inversion of means and ends so that humans became a means 
exploited with the help of machinery for the end of capital accumulation. The 
“automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs, co-
ordinated with the unconscious organs of the automaton, and together with the latter 
subordinated to the central moving force” (Marx 1867, 544-545). Anders describes a 
state of the world in which alienation not just takes place in the factory and the office, 
but also at a global scale so that the human world is turned into a machine that 
instrumentalises (almost) all human activity. 
In chapter 1.4 of Capital, Marx (1867, 163-177) introduces the notion of commodity 
fetishism. In capitalism, social relations are not immediately visible to humans, but 
are veiled and naturalised by the commodity form. We perceive the world as being 
made up by commodities and do not see how labour produces these commodities. 
Anders argues that advanced reification results in a worldwide form of reification and 
reified consciousness so that human alienation is not just a matter of non-control, 
blindness, and disregard, but also one of love: humans love things that are used to 
control, dominate and exploit them.  
                                            
5 In German original: „Scham, kein Ding zu sein“. 
6 In German original: „Selbsterniedrigung vor Selbstgemachtem“. 
7 In German original: „die Subjekte von Freiheit und Unfreiheit sind ausgetauscht“. 
8 In German original: „Frei sind die Dinge: unfrei ist der Mensch“. 
9 In German original: „mit solchen Daten, die einer Quantifizierung keinen Widerstand 
entgegensetzten“. 
10 In German original: „was natürlich automatisch zur Folge hatte, daß (zum Beispiel) die 
Vernichtung von Menschenleben oder die Verwüstung von Ländern, aus methodischen 
Sauberkeits- und Eindeutigkeitsgründen nur als Profit- oder Verlustgrößen eingesetzt und 
bewertet werden konnten“. 
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Apocalyptic technologies such as the atom bomb explode the means-ends 
relationship (Anders 1956, 247-351). They are not means (to ends such as 
production, exploitation, or victory over an enemy), but destroy all ends by having the 
potential to annihilate humanity. But if there can be no ends, then there are no means 
to an end. The nuclear bomb is rather the ultimate meanness that has the potential to 
terminate humanity. In contemporary capitalism, humans are turned into resources, 
which is why Anders (1980a, 21) speaks of the homo materia and says that today 
“being is being-raw-material”11(1980a, 33).  
The optimistic version of technological determinism (technological optimism) is an 
ideology that corresponds to the love and worship of the machine that Anders 
criticises. Technological determinism considers machines as autonomous actors that 
determine the development of society. In technological optimism, it is argued that 
machines result in positive developments of society. In technological pessimism, it is 
argued that they bring about or strengthen negative features of society. In digital 
determinism, digital technologies such as the computer, the Internet, web platforms, 
data, the mobile phone, etc. are treated as fetish objects that are said to determine 
society’s development. For Anders, technology and society stand in a dialectical 
relationship so that society shapes and is objectified in technology and technology 
shapes society. Technology is for Anders not a neutral thing that can have different 
effects depending on its contexts of use. He rather stresses that the social production 
of technology results in ingrained objective qualities that can unfold complex 
dynamics and contradictions in society when technologies are used and 
institutionalised. In a contradictory society, it is likely that we will find contradictory 
technologies that have contradictory effects on society that cannot be fully predicted.  
2.3. Big Data Fetishism 
Today, ideologues argue that big data is a new technological revolution that changes 
everything. An example: The “world of big data is poised to shake up everything from 
businesses and the sciences to healthcare, government, education, economics, the 
humanities, and every other aspect of society” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 
11). “The benefits to society will be myriad, as bid data becomes part of the solution 
to pressing global problems like addressing climate change, eradicating disease, and 
fostering good governance and economic development” (Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier 2013, 17). 
Wired Magazine is one of the publications at the forefront of spreading the 
ideology of optimistic digital determinism. Wired and similar neoliberal magazines like 
The Economist celebrate the “big data revolution”: 
 
• Wired for example reported that big data could cure cancer: “In fields like 
genetics, neuroscience, and cancer biology, we’ve built tools that have enabled 
us to acquire mountains of data. […] associate professor of systems biology at 
the University of Cambridge, and senior researcher at Cambridge’s Microsoft 
Research Lab, Fisher is mastering machine power to solve one of our biggest 
chronic health threats: cancer. Her research relies on the vast amounts of 
available data on cell biology, generated over the last several decades and 
plugged into computers to produce models that mimic how cancer cells behave. 
[…] The more data that’s factored in, the higher-resolution the models become, 
allowing better and quicker predictions about cell behaviour” (Bryce 2017).  
                                            
11 Translation: „Sein ist Rohstoffsein“. 
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• The Economist in an issue with the front-page headline “The world’s most 
valuable resource: Data and the new rules of competition” sees data as “the oil of 
the digital era” (The Economist, May 6, 2016, p. 9). “Data are to this century what 
oil was to the last one: a driver of growth and change” (p. 17).  
• Wired claimed that big data will boost productivity in general and agricultural 
productivity in particular: “The UK should invest much more in agricultural R&D if 
it is to guarantee its food security. Productivity in UK agriculture has been 
relatively static for the last ten years. […] Now, just as the green revolution was 
based on a change in plant genetics, a new data-led revolution is needed to 
ensure that productivity continues to grow in a sustainable and resilient way” 
(Tiffin 2015).  
• Another Wired claim was that big data in smart cities would result in overcoming 
urban problems: “Known as Bristol is Open, the project will effectively turn Bristol 
into a giant laboratory and look at how big data can be used to solve problems 
such as air pollution, traffic congestion and assisted living for the elderly. […] 
Sensors and other internet of things devices will be hooked up to the network to 
collect huge amounts of data from the city” (Temperton 2015).  
• Quantifying the human self with big data devices would personalise health care 
as well as prevent and cure illnesses: “we've […] seen an explosion of various 
wearables, apps and digital health devices […] Smartwatches regularly capture 
heart rate, and soon may add cuffless continuous blood pressure monitoring and 
glucose measures. […] Integrated home diagnostic ‘medical Tricorder’ platforms 
and connected pill bottles are coming to market. These will be paired with 
Amazon Echo and Your.MD and similar healthcare chatbots as interfaces. Mental 
health can be discerned from analysing our speech and the ‘digital exhaust’ from 
our smartphones. Breath can be analysed for more than alcohol, to track 
hydration status and molecules that can indicate a metabolic or malignant 
disease. Sensors in our beds can readily track the quantity and quality of sleep. 
Connected onesies or sensor-fitted pacifiers can track the vitals and activity of our 
newborns. […] Increasingly, software will check and parse the data from these 
streams to help identify trends and alert the patient and their care teams much 
earlier. Startups such as Sentrian (founded by Harley Street physician Jack 
Kreindler) are making sense of remote patient data to decrease preventable 
hospital admissions by making predictions, alerting patients and caregivers to act 
early in the course of changes or deterioration. […] The quantification of health 
will have true uses, can be crowdsourced and shared, and will improve outcomes 
(and perhaps even lower costs) across healthcare” (Kraft 2017). 
• Big data would prevent social unrest and terrorism: Big data can “pick up where 
the next bout of social unrest will appear in the Middle East, or reveal a new 
history of the US Civil War […] news mining can track changes in the public 
discourse that might foreshadow social unrest” (Steadman 2013) 
• Big data algorithms would make perfect choices among job applicants and would 
make selection panels a thing of the past: “Talent management startup Clustree 
uses big data to help human-resource departments find the right internal 
candidate for job vacancies. It does this by analysing millions of CVs to discern 
career paths and improve job recommendations. In October 2015, the startup, 
launched in 2013 by Bénédicte de Raphélis Soissan, raised $2.9 million from 
Alven Capital” (Medeiros 2016). 
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All of these examples share the same logic: It is claimed that collecting and analysing 
more data results in the better prevention of and the capacity to overcome problems 
society faces. As a result, big data would make humans healthier, wealthier and 
more educated and society safer, cleaner and more democratic. To increase the 
quantity of the computational analysis of society and the data it generates would give 
rise to better qualities.  
Big data logic disregards that society’s problems are grounded in power 
structures. Physical and mental health have to do with environmental influences such 
as pollution, radiation, human stress, working conditions, human happiness, the 
amount of available free time, the education system, etc. Productivity depends on 
human capacities and the development of human skills. Air pollution is predominantly 
the outcome of fossil fuel-based capitalism. Social unrest, crime and terrorism are 
grounded in social inequalities and the asymmetric distribution of power. Finding the 
best candidate for a job is not simply a matter of formal qualification, but also of 
informal, communicative and social skills. Big data’s logic of digital positivism only 
stresses potential positive impacts datafication could have. It disregards potential 
negative impacts.  
In the time of neoliberal health care, where public investments are scarce, big data 
can be used for identifying who should be treated (e.g. who are wealthy enough) and 
who should go without treatment. Big data in urban and political settings can be used 
for trying to predict who may become a criminal or a terrorist. But such predictive 
algorithms can result in false positives, undermine democracy and contribute to the 
creation of a fascist police state. Collecting big data about applicants and employees 
can foster economic surveillance that violates privacy and installs totalitarian 
management controls. Datafication requires server farms and ever more digital 
devices, which increases energy consumption. Energy sources are today 
predominantly based on fossil fuels or nuclear energy and only to a smaller degree 
on renewable and clean energy sources (Fuchs 2017b). Increasing big data can 
therefore have negative rebound effects on the environment. 
The big data fetishism of Wired and The Economist is a good example of digital 
fetishism. The authors, entrepreneurs, consultants and stories featured in such 
magazines express constant astonishment about what computers can do. “My god – 
it’s incredible what it – the machine – can do!”12 (Anders 2016, 34 [G: Anders 1956, 
28]). Big data fetishism disregards the societal context, contradictions and power 
structures, into which computer technologies are embedded. It argues for the 
replacement of human decisions and actions by algorithmic logic.  
In the age of big data and the Internet of things, human activity continues to be 
automated. Automation is not just limited to the economy, but extends into all realms 
of everyday life. Drone-bombs, self-driving cars and trains, Twitter bots, automated 
phone calls with computer-generated voices, algorithmic auctions and trading, the 
automated regulation of water, energy and heating in smart homes, and smart retail 
and shopping are only some of the examples. A study estimates that in the third 
2016-US presidential election debate, political bots accounted for 36.1% of the pro-
Trump tweets (Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley 2016). Politics has become semi-
automated. It has become difficult to discern what has been written, posted, liked, 
and re-posted by a human being or machine. Algorithms today strongly influence 
politics. The problem is that machines cannot make political judgements. They do not 
have morals or the ability to reflect. They cannot make judgements that are based on 
morals or politics. Fake attention and fake news can to a certain degree influence 
                                            
12 In the German original: „ ‚Mein Gott, was die kann!’ (nämlich die Maschine)“. 
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and thereby manipulate political decisions. Automated politics undermines 
democracy.  
Anders (1962/2014, 193) argued that in the age of the antiquation of the human 
being, reification takes on a form where products and technologies “transform 
themselves into pseudo-persons”. This insight has obtained an important truth today, 
where it is problematic that, in semi-automated politics and action in the age of big 
data, it can be difficult to discern whether humans or machines create information, 
visibility and attention. Secret algorithms determine your Facebook newsfeed and 
Google results. Social media bots are algorithms that try to intervene into these 
algorithms and to create artificial attention. Attention and visibility thereby not just 
become semi-automatic, but also communication power-asymmetries can be 
enforced. Post-truth politics on social media does not democratise politics. It does not 
shift away power from experts towards citizens, but rather enforces giving attention 
power to an elite.  
2.4. Post-Humanist Ideology 
Humans’ Promethean shame and desire to become identical with machines is most 
evident in post-humanist ideology. Originating in structuralism’s announcement of the 
death of the human subject, post-humanism aims at overcoming human existence 
and turning humans into machines. The computer scientist Ray Kurzweil argues that 
the miniaturization of computers will result in nanobots that can enter and repair the 
human body. Human life could thereby be prolonged to the stage where it would 
become possible to download the human brain onto computers, making humans 
immortal:  
 
“The power (price-performance, speed, capacity, and 
bandwidth) of information technologies is growing 
exponentially at an even faster pace, now doubling about 
every year.  […] Human brain scanning is one of these 
exponentially improving technologies. […] Nonbiological 
intelligence will be able to download skills and knowledge 
from other machines, eventually also from humans. […] 
We will be able to reengineer all of the organs and 
systems in our biological bodies and brains to be vastly 
more capable. […] Nanobots will have myriad roles within 
the human body, including reversing human aging (to the 
extent that this task will not already have been completed 
through biotechnology, such as genetic engineering)” 
(Kurzweil 2005, 25, 26, 27, 28). 
 
Kurzweil sees the computer as God, an omnipotent force that can radically transform 
nature. In Kurzweil’s ideology, the human being’s inferiority complex and admiration 
of the computer is taken to an extreme level so that the extinction of the human 
species is planned in order for humans to become parts of machines. Post-
humanism is the ideological dream of the human “to become equal to his deities, the 
machines”13 (Anders 2016, 40 [G: 1956, 36]). Kurzweil and other post-humanists 
solve the mind-body problem in a dualistic manner by assuming that the human mind 
                                            
13 In German original: „Sein Traum wäre es natürlich, seinen Göttern: den Apparaten, gleich 
zu werden, richtiger: ihnen ganz und gar, gewissermaßen ko-substanziell zuzugehören“. 
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can exist independently from the body in a computer. But in reality, there is a 
dialectic of the mind and the body. When one of the two dies, the other dies too. If 
becoming immortal by becoming a cyborg were technically possible, then in a 
capitalist society it would be likely that this capacity would be used for perfecting and 
immortalising the ruling class and fostering the annihilation of all those who do not fit 
into the capitalist models of productivity and entrepreneurship and of those who are 
ideologically scapegoated as harming capitalist growth. To “leave the human 
condition behind and stop being human” implies “the climax of all possible 
dehumanisation”14 (Anders 2016, 44 [G: 1956, 41-42]). Given that capitalism always 
has fascist potentials and we live in times of crises that can produce fascism, 
fostering post-humanism can also easily foster fascism. The combination of 
cyborgism and capitalism is likely to result in cyber-fascism, post-human fascism. 
3. Günther Anders’ Analysis of Television and Radio 
The second part of the first volume of Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen is dedicated 
to the analysis of broadcasting (Anders 1956, 97-211). It holds the title Die Welt als 
Phantom und Matrize (The World as Phantom and Matrix). Anders criticises that 
commercial broadcasting addresses the audience as consumers of commodities in 
order to increase sales. “The world has now become an ‘exposition’; and certainly an 
advertising exposition that is impossible not to visit, because we always already find 
ourselves in the middle of it”15 (Anders 1980a, 161). 
Anders focuses on three aspects in his critique of commercial broadcasting: 
labour, ideology, and alternatives. 
3.1. Audience and Consumer Labour 
As the first aspect of his critique, Anders stresses the role of labour in commercial 
media. He argues that consuming commercial broadcasts is a form of labour: 
“Everyone is in a way employed and occupied as a homeworker. […] The process 
becomes completely paradoxical insofar as the homeworker has to pay for his labour 
instead of being paid for his cooperation; he namely has to pay for the means of 
production (the device and, in many countries, even for the broadcasts) […] So he 
pays for selling himself”16 (Anders 1956, 103). Consumption of a TV commercial 
programme is “camouflaged labour”17 (Anders 1980b).  
The first volume of Anders’ principal work Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen was 
published in 1956. Around the same time, the Canadian Marxist Dallas Smythe 
formulated foundations of a critique of the political economy of commercial media 
that has striking parallels with Anders’ approach (see Smythe 1951, for a detailed 
discussion see Fuchs 2012). Smythe later developed this approach into the theory of 
the audience commodity and audience labour. He argues that the content of 
                                            
14 In German original: „‚das Mensch-Sein hinter sich bringen’. [...] ist [...] der Klimax 
möglicher Dehumanisierung“. 
15 Translation from German: „Die Welt ist nun zur ‚Ausstellung’ geworden, und zwar zu einer 
Werbeausstellung, die nicht zu besuchen unmöglich ist, weil wir uns immer schon ohnehin in 
ihr befinden“.  
16 Translation from German: „Jedermann ist gewissermaßen als Heimarbeiter angestellt und 
beschäftigt. [...] Vollends paradox wird der Vorgang dadurch, daß der Heimarbeiter, statt für 
diese seine Mitarbeit entlohnt zu werden, selbst für sie zu zahlen hat; nämlich für die 
Produktionsmittel (das Gerät und, jedenfalls in vielen Ländern, auch für die Sendungen) [...] 
Er zahlt also dafür, daß er sich selbst verkauft“. 
17 „getarnte Arbeit“ (Anders 1980a, 182). 
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advertising-funded media is not a commodity, but a “free lunch” (Smythe 1977, 5). 
The audience’s attention would be the commodity of advertising-funded media. 
Audiences would by watching commercial television, listening to commercial radio, or 
reading commercial publications, produce an audience commodity that is sold by 
corporate media to advertising clients. Smythe therefore speaks of audience labour 
as a productive form of labour that produces the audience commodity. Audiences 
“work to market [...] things to them- selves” (Smythe 1981, 4). “Because audience 
power is produced, sold, purchased and consumed, it commands a price and is a 
commodity. [...] Your audience members contribute your unpaid work time and in 
exchange you receive the program material and the explicit advertisements” (Smythe 
1981, 26, 233).  
Smythe and Anders share the insight that in advertising-based consumer 
capitalism, consumers become productive workers whose selves are sold. Anders in 
this context uses the notion of the homeworker, Smythe the concept of audience 
labour. It is unlikely that the Austrian philosopher and the Canadian political 
economist were aware of each other’s works when they were developing these ideas 
in the early 1950s. They independently developed a critical theory update of the 
concept of labour for the age of consumer capitalism.  
In big data capitalism, the homeworker, audience labour and the audience 
commodity have been transformed (Fuchs 2017a). Social media are based on user-
generated content, data and metadata. To a certain degree, Internet users behave 
like classical audiences who consume, watch, listen and read. But to a particular 
extent they are also producers of content, data and social relations. All audiences 
produce meanings in consumption. But in producing such meanings, users of 
commercial social media also produce data and metadata that make their interests, 
relations and behaviour traceable. Big data emerged from the surveillance interests 
of online corporations and state agencies that want to control users’ behaviours in 
order to accumulate profits and intelligence. Via big-data-based surveillance, online 
ads are being targeted and personalised. Predictive algorithms are used for trying to 
predict online behaviour. The price of the big data commodity is set in algorithmic 
auctions. By turning into the big data commodity and digital labour, the audience 
commodity and audience labour have become data- and surveillance-based, 
targeted, and algorithmic. Anders’ homeworker has today become a digital 
homeworker and Smythe’s audience worker a user-worker.  
Anders (1980a, 210-246) argues that one of the consequences of the capitalist 
world machine is that privacy becomes antiquated. The result of the application of 
surveillance technologies is according to Anders that “[n]ot only is it true that ‘The 
world is delivered to your home’, but also: ‘Your home is delivered to the world’”18 
(Anders 1980b). Surveillance means “the delivery of man to the world”19 (Ibid.). “As 
surveillance devices are used routinely, the main premise of totalitarianism is already 
created and, with it, totalitarianism itself”20 (Ibid.). 
In the age of the Internet and surveillance capitalism, the world is constantly and in 
real time delivered to us. We – and our activities, our interests, our communication, 
our contacts – are constantly delivered not to the world, but to our contacts and at the 
                                            
18 „Nicht nur gilt: ‚Die Welt wird ins Haus geliefert’ sondern auch: ‚Das Haus wird der Welt 
ausgeliefert’“ (Anders 1980a, 210).  
19 „Auslieferung des Menschen an die Welt“ (Anders 1980a, 210).  
20 „Wo Abhörapparate mit Selbstverständlichkeit verwendet werden, da ist die 
Hauptvoraussetzung des Totalitarismus geschaffen; und damit dieser selbst“ (Anders 1980a, 
221).  
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same time to online corporations and state security authorities. Edward Snowden’s 
revelations have shown that big data capitalism is driven by data corporations’ 
interest in amassing data about as many of our online activities as possible and state 
authorities’ interest in monitoring data flows because they pretend to assume or 
seem to assume that they can thereby prevent terrorism. The problem of this 
approach is that it creates a huge political-economic surveillance machine in which 
humans are reduced to the status of consumers and are at the same time treated as 
if all of them are terrorists. Categorical exploitation and categorical suspicion fuse, 
the combination of big data capital and the big data state creates a totalitarian 
surveillance machine that undermines privacy and civil rights.  
3.2. Ideology and the Media 
Ideology is the second aspect of Anders’ critique of commercial media. In the 
tradition of Georg Lukács and the Frankfurt School, Anders understands ideology as 
the production of false consciousness. But he argues that false consciousness is just 
an immediate goal that ideologues want to achieve. They would also aim at creating 
false will and ultimately false action: Ideology’s “immediate goal consists in producing 
‘false consciousness’ ”, but it is an “apparatus for the production of false action”21 
(Anders 1980). “The truth of ideology (that is: true compliance with the interest that 
lies at the basis of its production) is false praxis”22 (Anders 1980b). 
Anders argues that the commercial broadcast is a phantom world that is half 
present and half absent (Anders 1956, 111). The flood of images by “showing the 
world, veils the world”23 (Anders 1956, 4). The difference between appearance and 
being would disappear (111), the event would be shaped by the “matrix of its 
reproduction”24 (111). “Reality is transformed into the reproduction of its images”25 
(179).  
Anders argues that broadcasting results in banalisation (Verbiederung) and that it 
neutralises politics and critique. The cause of these forces would not be technological 
but political-economic in nature: “The fundamental neutraliser is […] the commodity 
character of all phenomena”26 (121). Commercial media manufacture reality: “There 
are really numerous events that happen as they happen in order to be useable as 
broadcasts”27 (191). According to Anders, the commodity requires banalisation in 
order to be bought and sold. “Since the broadcast is a commodity, it too must be 
served in status that is pleasant to our eyes and ears, optimally ready for 
consumption, alienated, removed from its core, and assimilated; that is, in a manner 
that it addresses us as our simile, custom-designed, as if it were part of us”28 (Anders 
                                            
21 „Mag auch ihr Nächstziel darin bestehen, ‚falsches Bewußtsein’ herzustellen“, so ist 
Ideologie „das Gerät zur Produktion falschen Handelns“ (Anders 1980a, 190).  
22 „Die Wahrheit der Ideologie (das heißt: die wahre Erfüllung des ihrer Herstellung 
zugrundeliegenden Interesses) ist die falsche Praxis“ (Anders 1980a, 191).  
23 „die Welt zeigend, die Welt verhüllten“.  
24 Translation from German: „Matrize ihrer Reproduktion”. 
25 Translation from German: „daß das Wirkliche zum Abbild seiner Bilder wird“. 
26 Translation from German: „Der fundamentale Neutralisator [...] ist der Warencharakter aller 
Erscheinungen“. 
27 Translation from German: „Wirklich gibt es zahllose Geschehnisse, die nur deshalb so 
geschehen, wie sie geschehen, damit sie als Sendungen brauchbar seien“. 
28 Translation from German: „Da nun auch die Sendung eine Ware ist, muß auch sie in 
augen- und ohrengerechtem, in einem optimal genußbereiten, entfremdeten, entkernten, 
assimilierbaren Zustande serviert werden; also so, daß sie uns als unser Simile, nach 
unserem Maße Zugeschnittenes, als unsereins anspricht”. 
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1956, 122). Anders’ notion of banalisation has parallels to Herbert Macuse’s (1964) 
notion of one-dimensional man. Marcuse analyses how the commercialisation of 
culture creates “one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, 
and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse 
and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe” (Marcuse 1964, 
14).  
Unilateralism is another aspect of ideological media. “The relation human-world 
becomes unilateral”29 (Anders 1956, 129). By the unilateralism of communication, 
Anders means a one-sided information flow: “Since the devices speak on our behalf, 
they also deprive us of language; they deprive us of our capacity to speak, our 
opportunities to speak, and of our pleasure to speak”30 (Anders 1956, 107). “Without 
the radio the massive successes of Hitler would have been unthinkable. Fascism and 
radio went hand in hand”31 (Anders 1980b). 
The one-dimensional human is for Anders at the same time dualistic, a phantom. It 
is present and absent and lives at the same time in different realities (the real and the 
imagined world, reality and fiction, reality and simulation). It is occupied with many 
activities at the same time and can therefore not be focused. It is not an individual, 
but a di-vidual (Divisum). The divided individual is “divided into a multiplicity of 
functions”32 (Anders 1956, 141)  
Anders argues that commercial media present the micro world as macro world and 
the macro world as micro world (Anders 1956, 152-153). There is both 
sensationalism and anti-sensationalism (153). The unimportant is presented as 
sensation and spectacle, whereas truly important and dangerous developments are 
minimised. Whereas sensationalism makes mountains out of molehills, anti-
sensationalism makes molehills out of mountains (153). 
So for Anders, commercial media’s manufacturing of reality entails banalisation, 
unilateralism, di-vidualism, sensationalism, and anti-sensationalism. One can say 
that these are ideological strategies. But for Anders, capitalism is today “post-
ideological” and ideology has become antiquated. It is not that ideologies no longer 
exist. Anders rather says they are no longer needed because false statements and 
lies about the world have become the world (Anders 1956, 193; see also Anders 
1980a, 188-192). Ideology produces post-ideology. Anders (1980a, 261) argues that 
ideologies are theoretical systems that interpret the whole (although in a false 
manner): “The images coming from all over the world that are ceaselessly 
transmitted to us have nothing to do with what were still called, only fifty years ago, 
images of the world. Now they are always only single trees, not the forest”33 (Anders 
1980b).  
The ideological strategies of banalisation, unilateralism, di-vidualism, 
sensationalism, and anti-sensationalism remain relevant and have taken on new 
qualities in big data capitalism. 
                                            
29 Translation from German: „Die Beziehung Mensch-Welt wird unilateral“. 
30 Translation from German: „Da uns die Geräte das Sprechen abnehmen, nehmen sie uns 
auch die Sprache fort; berauben sie uns unserer Ausdrucksfähigkeit, unserer 
Sprachgelegenheit, ja unserer Sprachlust“. 
31 In German original: „Ohne dieses [das Radio] sind die Massenerfolge Hitlers nicht 
denkbar. Faschismus und Rundfunk sind Korrelate“ (Anders 1980a, 88). 
32 Translation from German: „in eine Mehrzahl von Funktionen zerlegt“. 
33 In German original: „Die ‚Bilder aus aller Welt’, die man uns pausenlos zuleitet, haben mit 
dem, was man noch vor fünfzig Jahren ‚Weltbilder’ nannte, überhaupt nichts mehr zu tun. 
Immer sind es einzelne Bäume statt des Waldes“ (Anders 1980a, 261-262).  
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Contemporary networked digital media platforms operate at extremely high speed 
and publish an immense amount of content. In the world of big and ultra-accelerated 
content and data, attention is a scarce good. In order to attract attention online, 
content today tends to be compressed, short, superficial, and ephemeral. The 
feudalisation of the public sphere, the world of engagement, publishing and debate, 
has in the age of Twitter and reality TV taken on the form of highly accelerated 
banalisation and tabloidisation that appears to democratise the public sphere (user-
generated content as “participatory culture”), but is in essence the antiquation of 
engaging political information, political communication and political debate.  
Also unilaterialism has taken on new forms in the world of social media and user-
generated content. The broadcast media’s monopoly of voice has been broken. Now 
(almost) everyone can speak, broadcast, post, comment, etc. online. The computer is 
a universal machine, a tool for the production, dissemination and consumption of 
information. Technological convergence of what in traditional broadcasting are 
different technologies and institutions has enabled the emergence of prosumption 
(productive consumption, consumers who are producers of information). But the 
capitalist world of prosumption is far from democratic. It is driven by the logic of 
accumulating profits and attention. Online attention is time. Time is scarce. Time is 
money. Online attention turns into money. Given the capitalist stratification of the 
online world, we also find a stratification of attention: Celebrities, corporations and 
some others dominate online visibility. They together form the online elite that 
achieves high attention and visibility. In contrast, proletarian users can speak and 
post, but are hardly heard. The result is a class conflict between online celebs that 
accumulate and are rich in attention, and online proletarians that are the capitalist 
online attention economy’s poor.  
In the age of social media, the di-vidual has already become antiquated and has 
turned into a multi-vidual. We are constantly confronted with a vast amount of content, 
opinions, choices, new releases, updates, requests for inputs, messages, etc. The 
problem is that the multiverse of information is to a large degree one and the same 
type of superficial information that distracts attention from information and 
communication that really matters and can make a difference to the world. Critical, 
dialectical information often remains buried and unrecognised in the vast flow of big 
data. One-dimensionality disguises itself as plurality. Information that stands out from 
big data and achieves mass attention as sensation and spectacle is often banal and 
trivial. Meanwhile, critiques and thoughtful ideas that could make a real difference, 
that are based on complex arguments and require space and time for development, 
are mostly overlooked, ignored and repressed anti-sensations.  
Although there is also classical censorship in the online world, the main form of 
repression online is equal to what Herbert Marcuse (1969) terms repressive 
tolerance: 
 
“All points of view can be heard: […] in endlessly dragging 
debates over the media, the stupid opinion is treated with 
the same respect as the intelligent one, the misinformed 
may talk as long as the informed, and propaganda rides 
along with education, truth with falsehood. This pure 
toleration of sense and nonsense is justified by the 
democratic argument that […] all contesting opinions must 
be submitted to 'the people' for its deliberation and choice. 
[…] Other words can be spoken and heard, other ideas 
can be expressed, but, at the massive scale of the 
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conservative majority (outside such enclaves as the 
intelligentsia), they are immediately 'evaluated' (i.e. 
automatically understood) in terms of the public language-
-a language which determines 'a priori' the direction in 
which the thought process moves” (Marcuse 1969, 94, 
96). 
On social media, all opinions can be posted and all content can be assessed and 
commented on in real-time. But given the asymmetries of visibility and attention in 
the flood of information (due to e.g. sponsored/branded content, targeted advertising, 
reputational hierarchies, etc.), non-trivial, complex and critical voices have a harder 
time to be recognised and to make a difference. 
In the age of social media and prosumption, we forget that we are working and 
when we are working. Anders’ notion that there is a Promethean gap between doing 
and feeling has reached a new level, as we in real time can access lots of information 
about the world and communicate with many parts of the world, but at the same time 
labour no longer feels like, and hardly is perceived as, exploitation and a class 
relation.  
In classical commodity fetishism, the “definite social relation between men 
themselves” assumes “the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx 1867, 
165). In the world of capitalist social media, commodity fetishism has become 
antiquated and has turned into inverse commodity fetishism. When using Facebook 
or Google, we cannot see and experience the commodity, but rather experience 
sociality as if it were unmediated by the commodity form. We do not pay money for 
accessing social media because it provides access as a “free lunch”. But in reality 
this lunch is not for free, but rather is a means for exploiting our digital labour so that 
personal data is turned into a commodity behind our backs, not visible to and not 
directly experienceable for us. In inverse commodity fetishism, the social hides the 
commodity form. Alienation appears as social and non-alienated fun and pleasure. 
Günther Anders anticipated this development: “Despite the fact that we really live in 
an alienated world, the world is presented to us as if it is a world for us, as if it were 
our own and like ourselves”34 (1956, 116).  
“As consumers we contemporaries are today consistently ‘secret agents’” 35 
(Anders 1980a, 171) because it is kept secret “that, for what and for whom he 
performs his activity when he sits in front of his goggle-box”36 (Ibid. 170). The goggle-
box has today turned into the Google-universe. In the case of the goggle-box that 
broadcasts advertising-funded programmes, audience labour is kept ideologically 
secret through the consumers’ enjoyment and relaxation. In the Google universe of 
social media, inverse commodity fetishism creates the immediate experience of 
sociality so that communication and sociality act as the forces that keep the status of 
users as workers secret.  
                                            
34 Translation from German: „Obwohl wir in Wahrheit in einer entfremdeten Welt leben, wird 
uns die Welt so dargeboten, als ob sie für uns da wäre, als ob sie unsere wäre und 
unseresgleichen“.  
35 Translation from German: „Als Konsumenten sind wir Heutigen durchweg 
‚Geheimagenten’“. 
36 Translation from German: „weil vor ihm selbst geheimgehalten wird, daß er, wofür er und 
für wen er, wenn er vor seiner Schüssel sitzt, seine Tätigkeit ausübt“. 
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3.3. Alternatives 
When reading Anders one must always bear in mind that he uses exaggeration as a 
means of criticism. What drove Anders’ radical critique was a deep-seated humanism 
and concerns about the human being’s situation in capitalist societies. He was not 
opposed to alternative forms and organisations of communication. He argues that the 
key task is the formation of moral phantasy that aims at overcoming the Promethean 
gap (Anders 1956, 273). Anders favoured means that allow humans to develop such 
phantasy. 
In the preface to the 5th edition of the first volume of Die Antiquiertheit des 
Menschen, Anders argues that the Vietnam war, where television and the media 
showed images of killed civilians, which would have had an enlightening effect:  
 
“It has, in fact, been shown that, in certain situations, 
television images can deliver the reality, in which we 
would otherwise not participate in at all, into the home and 
can shake us up and motivate us to take historically 
important steps. Perceived images are worse than 
perceived reality, but they are better than nothing. The 
images of the Vietnam War that were channelled into 
American homes day by day, really ‘opened’ the screen-
gazing eyes of millions of citizens eyes who were staring 
at the screen, triggering a protest that greatly contributed 
to the end of the genocide that took place at that time”37 
(1956, VIII). 
The question is how alternative media and digital media that strengthen human 
imagination could look like today. Certainly they have to be non-commercial and 
pursue a non-profit agenda. 
Club 2 in Austria and After Dark in Britain were prototypes of slow broadcast 
media. The Club 2 debate format originated in the 1970s in the context of the 
Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF), Austria’s public service broadcaster. Club 
2 was an open-ended, live, uncensored, controversial debate with diverse 
participants. Club 2 was a true public sphere.  
We need slow media. Offline and online. Slow media. And slow media 2.0. Is a 
new version of Club 2 possible today? What could Club 2.0 look like? Speaking of a 
second version can on the one hand mean that the Club 2 concept could be revived 
to help strengthening the public sphere in times of authoritarian capitalism. On the 
other hand, one has to take into account that society does not stand still. Rather, it 
develops dynamically and has created new realities such as the Internet that has 
become a key part of public communication. Club 2.0 therefore also means a 
somewhat updated concept of Club 2 that sticks to its ground rules but also extends 
the concept. If Club 2.0 can go from possibility to reality is not simply a technical 
                                            
37 Translation from German: „Unterdessen hat es sich nämlich herausgestellt, daß 
Fernsehbilder doch in gewissen Situationen die Wirklichkeit, deren wir sonst überhaupt nicht 
teilhaftig würden, ins Haus liefern und uns erschüttern und zu geschichtlich wichtigen 
Schritten motivieren können. Wahrgenommene Bilder sind zwar schlechter als 
wahrgenommene Realität, aber sie sind doch besser als nichts. Die täglich in die 
amerikanischen Heime kanalisierten Bilder vom vietnamesischen Kriegsschauplatz haben 
Millionen von Bürgern die auf die Mattscheibe starrenden Augen erst wirklich ‚geöffnet’ und 
einen Protest ausgelöst, der sehr erheblich beigetragen hat zum Abbruch des damaligen 
Genozids“ (Anders 1956, VIII). 
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question. It is a question of political economy. It is a political question because it 
requires the decision to break with the logic of commercial, entertainment-oriented 
TV dominated by reality TV and comparable formats. Club 2.0 requires a political 
choice in favour of public service media and public interest media. Club 2.0 is also an 
economic question because realising it requires breaking with the principles that 
shape the media today, such as high speed, superficiality, brevity, the 
algorithmisation and automation of human communication, post-truth, the spectacle, 




- Open-ended discussion 
- Live broadcast 
- Uncensored 
- Controversial topics 
- 4-8 participants 
- Diversity of guests 
(incl. non-experts) 
- One rotating host 
- Leather couches &  
coffee table 
- Floor lamps &  
dark studio 
- No studio audience 
- TV broadcast 
- Online broadcast on  
videoplatform C2-Tube  
Audience,  
users 
No use of existing online platforms (Twitter, Facebook, 
Internet-based discussion and video platform C2-Tube 
1) Viewers (online, TV) 
2) Discussion inputs 
Video platform C2-Tube 
Registered users (real/full names; registration requires 
e.g. licence fee number or utility bill) 
Number of active/registered users can be limited 
1 discussion input video per registered user can be 
uploaded throughout the whole debate: 
- at least 3 minutes long 
- maximum of 5 minutes 
- opinion & discussion question 
- Uploaded as online video to C2-Tube 
3) Audience/User discussion: 
Two selected videos are open for discussion: 
- Discussion on the C2-Tube platform 
- Video- and text-based comments:  
limited to x times per registered user 
Video comments: exactly 5 minutes long [shorter not 
possible] 
Text-based comments: at least 500 words, no upper 
limit [e.g. 10,000 words => will not be read] 
User videos as 
discussion inputs 
at 2 points of time; 
Selection (can be 
varied): 
- Club 2.0 team 
- Random 
- One registered 
user is randomly 






Figure 1: Concept of Club 2.0 
Figure 1 visualises a possible concept of Club 2.0. This model is a basic idea that 
certainly can be varied in many ways and is merely one of many possible versions. 
The key aspects are the following: 
 
• Club 2/After Dark’s ground rules: Club 2.0 uses and extends the traditional 
principles of Club 2/After Dark. The live television part requires all of the traditional 
principles of Club 2/After Dark. These ground rules are key for the format’s 
success. Club 2.0’s broadcasts need to be open-ended, live, and uncensored.  
• Cross-medium: Club 2.0 is a cross-medium that brings together live television and 
the Internet.  
• Online video: Club 2.0 live broadcasts are available online via a video platform. 
• Autonomous social media, no traditional social media: Existing commercial social 
media platforms (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) are not suited because they 
are not based on the principles of slow media and public interest. Broadcasting 
Club 2.0 over YouTube would for example result in frequent advertising breaks 
that would disrupt and disable discussion.  
• Autonomous video platform C2Tube: Club 2.0 requires its own video platform that 
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we can provisionally call C2Tube. C2Tube poses the possibility for viewers to 
watch the debate online and via a diversity of technical devices. 
• Interactivity: C2Tube also allows interactive features that can be used to a certain 
degree. 
• User-generated discussion inputs: There is the possibility for discussion inputs 
generated by users. Such a feature requires that users are non-anonymous and 
register on the platform. Anonymity encourages Godwin’s law that says that “as an 
anonymous online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison 
involving Hitler approaches 1”. Setting an upper limit of registrations or activating 
only a certain number of users during a specific debate allows limiting the number 
of registered and active users. The selection of active users can for example be 
made randomly. Or all users can be allowed to participate. User-generated 
discussion inputs should ideally be in video format. The number of user-generated 
discussion inputs that can be generated should best be limited (ideally to just one 
per active user). User-generated discussion inputs can be uploaded to the C2 
platform. 
• Interfacing the studio debate with user-generated videos: At certain points of time 
during the live broadcast, a user-generated video input is chosen and broadcast 
and informs the studio debate. Users in such videos formulate their own views and 
can also provide a question for discussion. Ideally during a two to three hour-long 
debate, about two user-generated videos could be broadcast. Inevitably a 
selection mechanism is needed for deciding which user-generated videos are 
broadcast. There are several principles such as random selection, selection by the 
Club 2.0 production team, random choice of a registered user who is enabled to 
choose the video, special guests who make the selection, etc. 
• User discussion: Club 2.0 also enables discussion between users. Discussion 
could take place simultaneously to the live broadcast and/or after it. The two 
selected user-generated C2 videos can be opened up for discussion on the C2 
platform. Ideally, video- and text-based comments should be possible. There 
should be a minimum length for text-based comments and maybe a maximum 
length for video comments. In order to stick with the principle of slow media and 
avoid the Twitter effect of accelerated standstill, the number of video and text 
comments a single user can post per debate should be limited. 
• Forgetting data: Videos are fairly large and storage-intensive. Therefore the 
question is what should happen to all those videos that are uploaded, but not 
broadcast and not opened for discussion. Given that they have no practical use, 
they could be deleted. This means that the users must be aware of the fact that 
uploading a video means loss of data. Contemporary social media store all data 
and meta-data forever. Forgetting data can therefore be used as a counter-
principle. The online debates that feature text and video comments could either be 
preserved or deleted after a certain period of time.  
• Privacy-friendliness: Contemporary social media use data and user surveillance 
for economic and political purposes, i.e. for making monetary profits by selling 
targeted advertisements and implementing a political surveillance society that 
promises more security but undermines privacy and installs a regime of 
categorical suspicion. Club 2.0’s way of dealing with data should be privacy 
friendly, only store the minimum amount of data necessary for operating the 
platform, not sell user data, and in general use good practices of data and privacy 
protection. This principle is also called privacy-by-design, which means that 
privacy is designed into the platform and the format. This does however not mean 
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that users who debate publicly are anonymous. Privacy rather relates to the way 
user data is stored and handled.  
• Social production: Contemporary social media are highly individualistic. The 
production of user-generated Club 2.0 input videos could in contrast take on the 
form of social production that transcends individualism and creates truly social 
media content by integrating Club 2.0 into educational institutions (schools, 
universities, adult education, etc.) where individuals together learn by co-creating 
video content as input for discussions. For doing so, the topic of a specific Club 
2.0 evening needs to be known in advance, which can be achieved by publishing a 
description. Groups of individuals can get together and prepare videos that they 
can on the evening of the broadcast upload to C2Tube once the uploading 
possibility is enabled.  
 
Club 2.0 alone would not achieve a better world. In times of authoritarian, high-speed 
capitalism, complexity and critique are largely missing from the news and political 
information and communication. Club 2.0 could contribute to strengthening the public 
sphere. Public sphere communication is part of society’s critical capacities. With the 
rise of authoritarian capitalism, we have witnessed intensifying attacks on critical 
capacities. Imagine Donald Trump sitting on the Club 2.0 leather couch together with 
some of his hardest critics: In this situation, there is no Twitter that allows him to 
reduce interaction to throwing short sound bites into the anonymous virtual space 
from a distance. There is only face-to-face live discussion without escape, where 
claims and counter-claims are explored, ideologies are questioned, opposite opinions 
are given time to meet and clash, etc. Club 2.0 would bring back a bit of dialectics 
into a one-dimensional world, in which the public sphere is under attack by 
authoritarian capitalism. 
4. Klaus Eichmann and Claude Eatherly: Günther Anders’ Engagement with the 
Son of the Shoah-Organiser and the Hiroshima-Nuclear Bomb Pilot 
For Anders, the 20th century was an age of catastrophe epitomised by Auschwitz and 
the atom bomb. The apocalyptic potentials of technologies and society has become 
so large that the Promethean gap creates apocalyptic blindness (1956, 233-308). 
Blind belief in progress is one of the sources of apocalyptic blindness (276-277). New 
nihilistic forces have been unleashed that have created the potential for the reduction 
to nothingness, the “reduction ad nihil” (239). In the age of catastrophes, nihilism and 
annihilation have merged into what Anders terms annihilism (Annihilismus) (304).  
4.1. Günther Anders and Klaus Eichmann 
Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962) was a senior assault unit leader in the SS, who in the 
Reich Main Security Office was in charge of the organisation of the displacement and 
deportation of Jews. After the end of the Second World War, Eichmann as one of the 
main people responsible for the Shoah escaped from capital punishment in the 
Nuremberg Trials by first going underground and then fleeing to Argentina. The 
Mossad transferred Eichmann in 1960 to Israel, where he was put on trial in 1961 
and found guilty of crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, the extermination of minorities, and membership in criminal organisations 
(the SS, the Gestapo, and the SS’s intelligence service). Eichmann was sentenced to 
death and hanged. Klaus Eichmann is Adolf Eichmann’s oldest child. In 1964, 
Günther Anders (1964a, 1964b) sent a long letter to Klaus Eichmann that was 
published as a book. 
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In this letter, Anders characterises the Nazi regime and the Shoah as a monstrous 
machine and coins the concept of Eichmanns. Eichmanns are the “administrators 
and performers”38 (Anders 1964b) of monstrosities. Eichmanns are servile (carrying 
out monstrosities like any other job), disgraceful (aspiring to their positions), stubborn 
(willing to lose their humanity for gaining total power), greedy, and cowardly (Anders 
1964a, 19). Anders’ characterisation of Eichmanns reminds us of Erich Fromm’s 
analysis of the fascist as authoritarian personality: “The love for the powerful and the 
hatred for the powerless which is so typical of the sado-masochistic character 
explains a great deal of Hitler's and his followers' political actions” (Fromm 1942/2001, 
200). The Eichmanns’ servility, disgracefulness, stubbornness, greed and cowardice 
are simultaneous expressions of striving for and submitting to power and executing 
violence against the powerless. Adolf Eichmann strove for power and in order to be 
powerful submitted to the Nazi machine’s logic. As one of its powerful agents, he 
executed the regimes terror against its victims.  
Eichmann is for Anders a symbol of the monstrosities that are an immanent 
potential of modern society and modern technologies. Anders in his letter explicitly 
refers to the Promethean gap without calling this phenomenon by this name (Anders 
1964a, 24). The effect of the monstrosity of technology is that “the ‘outsized’ leaves 
us cold – or rather, not even cold (since coldness would also be a kind of feeling), but 
completely indifferent; we are becoming ‘emotional illiterates’”39  (Anders 1964b). 
Adolf Eichmann’s trial showed that he considered the killing of six million Jews with 
emotional coldness as a bureaucratic act and act of obedience. He considered 
himself innocent and argued that he was just a cog in the machine. 
Hannah Arendt (1977) argues that Adolf Eichmann was not an extraordinarily 
“diabolical or demonic” person (288), but one of many ordinary, banal Germans. He 
was “terribly and terrifyingly normal” (276) in his worship of power as fetish. 
Monstrosity requires what Arendt terms the banality of evil at the level of the 
individuals and groups carrying it out. But in considering monstrosity and evil as 
banal, there is a certain danger of excusing the perpetrators, which became evident 
in Adolf Eichmann’s trial. In his final plea, Eichmann argued that he was not guilty 
because he only obeyed orders:  
 
“The guilt for the mass murder is solely that of the political 
leaders. […] I accuse the leaders of abusing my 
obedience. […] Obedience is commended as a virtue. 
May I therefore ask that consideration be given to the fact 
that I obeyed, and not whom I obeyed. […] I have already 
said that the top echelons, to which I did not belong, gave 
the orders, and they rightly, in my opinion, deserved 
punishment for the atrocities which were perpetrated on 
the victims on their orders. But the subordinates are now 
also victims. I am one of such victims”40. In his final plea 
to be pardoned, Eichmann wrote that there “is a need to 
draw a line between the leaders responsible and the 
                                            
38 In German original: „Leiter und Handlanger“ (Anders 1964a, 19). 
39 In German original: „das ‚zu Große’ läßt uns kalt, nein (denn auch Kälte wäre ja noch eine 
Art von Gefühl) noch nicht einmal kalt, sondern völlig unangerührt: wir werden zu 
‚emotionalen Analphabeten’“ (Anders 1964a, 28). 
40 The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, Session 120, http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Sessions/Session-120-03.html (accessed on May 3, 2017). 
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people like me forced to serve as mere instruments in the 
hands of the leaders” (Kershner 2016).  
Eichmann presented himself as a cog in the Nazi-machine. The machine would have 
to be blamed, not its cogs. Given that Adolf Eichmann was an ordinary and banal 
character operating as part of a terroristic machine, Anders raises an important 
question for the ethics of technology: Given the uncontrollability and monstrosity of 
technical apparatuses, can humans be blamed for the machines’ negative effects? 
Anders’ answer is that those who are creating monstrous machines do so as a 
conscious act they could refuse. They are therefore morally guilty. Adolf Eichmann’s 
“guilt in regard to the monstrosity remains monstrous. Why? Because he can’t be 
considered just another one of the millions of workers trapped in their specialization, 
who as part of the processes of the apparatus to which they were bound really had 
been completely stripped of the ability to conceptualize its ultimate and monstrous 
effects”41 (Anders 1964b).  
Anders argues that the whole world has turned into a machine, the world machine 
(Anders 1964a, 52). Accumulation, expansion, colonialism, imperialism and 
maximum performance would be the very principles of the machine (Anders 1964a, 
50-51). The “machines’ thirst for accumulation is insatiable”42 (Anders 1964b). “The 
machines are being transformed into a single machine43 , the “total machine”44 
(Anders 1980b). 
Without explicitly acknowledging it, Anders takes up the Marxist-humanist 
argument that capitalism’s logic of accumulation results in dehumanising and 
alienating effects. Global capitalism is the world machine that Anders talks about. 
The world machine’s effect is that society and humans lose their humanity (Anders 
1964a, 55). Anders’ deep humanism becomes evident when he analyses how 
dehumanisation works. Out of Anders’ examination of the deepest inhumanity speaks 
the political demand for a humane world, a world that accords to human essence, 
desires, needs and potentials.  
Anders’ letter ends in the suggestion that Klaus Eichmann shows solidarity with 
the anti-nuclear movement as a symbol for the protest against the possibilities of 
annihilation. Anders’ letter remained unanswered, which led him at the age of 85 in 
1988 to write a second letter to Klaus Eichmann (Anders 1964a, 76-97).  
4.2. Günther Anders and Claude Eatherly 
Claude Eatherly (1918-1978) was an officer in the US Army Air Forces. On August 6, 
1945, he was the pilot of an aircraft that supported dropping the nuclear bomb “Little 
Boy” on Hiroshima. Eatherly commanded the Straight Flush plane that explored the 
weather over Hiroshima and gave the “’go ahead’ to the bomb-carrying plane to 
bomb the primary target” (Eatherly and Anders 1962, 81). Different from others 
involved in the bombing, who let themselves be celebrated as heroes, Eatherly was 
                                            
41 In German original: „Seine Schuld am Monströsen bleibt trotzdem monströs. Warum? 
Deshalb, weil er jenen Millionen von Arbeitern, die zu ihren Spezialhandriffen verurteilt 
bleiben, und die durch die Indirektheit des Apparatsprozesses, dem sie integriert sind, der 
Möglichkeit, sich dessen letzte und ungeheure Effekte vorzustellen, tatsächlich beraubt sind, 
nicht zugezählt werden kann“ (Anders 1964a, 31). 
42 In German original: Der „Akkumulationshunger der Maschinen ist unstillbar“ (Anders 
1964a, 51).  
43 In German original: „Die Maschinen werden zu einer einzigen Maschine“ (Anders 1980a, 
120).  
44 In German original: „Totalmaschine“ (Anders 1980a, 121).  
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plagued by guilt. He unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide. Eatherly and Anders 
(1962) engaged in an exchange of letters about Hiroshima that lasted from 1959 until 
1962. Eatherly was declared mentally ill and imprisoned in a mental hospital. The 
exchange between him and Anders provides indications that this was done to him 
because he spoke out publicly against nuclear warfare.  
In his first letter to Eatherly, Anders argues that the atom bomb is characteristic of 
the age of the Promethean gap: “we can produce more than we can mentally 
reproduce; […] we are not made for the effects which we can make by means of our 
man-made machines” (Eatherly and Anders 1962, 3).  
Paul Tibbits, pilot of the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the atom bomb on 
Hiroshima, recalled: “I just hadn’t even come close to imagine what the effect was. 
[…] One man is gonna go out with an airplane and a crew and a weapon and do 
what thousand airplanes used to do”45. Tibbits’ description precisely confirms that 
nuclear warfare is one of the realms in which the Promethean gap operates. 
Anders argues that Eatherly’s doubts and criticisms of nuclear warfare show that 
although the pilot had been “misused as a screw” in the military machine, he 
“contrary to others […] remained a human being”, or became “one anew” (5). 
Eatherly says in one of the letters that war “is wild and inhuman. War should not be 
done by us, the head of all creatures. It seems that those sleeping under the ashes of 
Hiroshima were crying for peace” (31). Eatherly expressed the need for “the 
banishment of all nuclear weapons” (81).  
When Eatherly was offered turning his life story into a Hollywood movie, Anders 
warned him that Hollywood’s focus on profit and entertainment could portray him as 
“a harmless figure who does not belong to reality but only to the world of make 
believe” (28). Anders here draws on his theoretical analysis of broadcasting’s 
transformation of the world into a phantom-world. He recommended to Eatherly to 
first write an autobiography and to legally demand that a movie would have to closely 
follow the book.  
For Anders, Eichmann and Eatherly are two characteristic and symbolic figures of 
the age of the world machine. But the difference is that Eichmann never accepted 
any responsibility, whereas Eatherly changed his own political position and started 
opposing the military machine that he had himself been part of: “No, Eatherly is 
precisely not the twin of Eichmann, but his great and hope-inspiring antipode. Not the 
man who passes off machinery as a pretext for renouncing conscience, but, on the 
contrary the man who recognizes machinery as the fatal danger to conscience” 
(Eatherly and Anders 1962, 108-109).  
“[I]f we don't accept the Eichmann arguments, we are considered – even in those 
countries which to-day are actually revolted by the special case Eichmann, as being 
disloyal or being traitors” (Eatherly and Anders 1962, 126). Authorities stigmatized 
Eatherly as being psychologically abnormal because he questioned imperialism’s 
abnormal normality. Militarist ideology that is part of the dominant ideological 
narrative declares demands for peace as abnormal, war as peace, pacifism as 
violence, etc.  
Herbert Marcuse has stressed that by ideologically and linguistically declaring 
violence to be normal, political horror is legitimated and rationalized: “Technological 
progress is accompanied by a progressive rationalization and even realization of the 
imaginary. The archetypes of horror as well as of joy, of war as well as of peace lose 
                                            
45 Paul Tibbets on Dropping the Atomic Bomb, http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-
ii/bombing-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki/videos/paul-tibbets-on-dropping-the-atomic-bomb 
(accessed on May 3, 2017). 
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their catastrophic character. Their appearance in the daily life of the individuals is no 
longer that of irrational forces – their modern avatars are elements of technological 
domination, and subject to it” (1964, 253). Like Marcuse, Anders criticises the one-
dimensional, instrumental language used by the powerful to downplay the horrors of 
mass annihilation. He for example writes that the use of the term “megacorpse” for 
one hundred million dead human beings in military jargon indicates that “the inhibition 
against weapons of mass destruction has also been killed”46 (Anders 1982, 368). 
Anders argues that the ideological inversions of language and facts “vilifies us as 
‘troublemakers’ because we cause trouble to their troublemaking”47 (Anders 1982, 
370).  
The Enola Gay pilot Tibbits also used this one-dimensional militaristic ideology 
that sees absolute violence as peace and that considers pacifists to be crazy. He 
argued that dropping the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki “brought peace to 
the world at that time. […] The morality of dropping that bomb was not my business. 
[…] Morality – there is no such thing in warfare. I don’t care what we are dropping, an 
atom bomb, or whether you are dropping a 100 pound bomb, or you are shooting a 
riffle. You gotta leave the moral issue out of it”48. By arguing that war has no morality 
and that nuclear war is peace, Tibbits rationalises and defends his own role as the 
person who commanded the plane that dropped the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. At 
the same time, he ideologically declares Eatherly crazy in order to assure himself of 
his own “normality” and the “normality” of the military potential to create a nuclear 
apocalypse. He says that he “never lost a night’s sleep on the deal” and that Eatherly 
became “unbalanced after the end of the war, but he had had a problem of mental, 
should we say, incapacities/disabilities leading up to the war time”49.  
4.3. Annihilism Today 
Comparable to Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002) concept of the dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Anders stresses that capitalism turns against the Enlightenment 
ideals and produces catastrophic potentials. Capitalism creates destructive potentials 
for the “self-destruction of enlightenment” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, xvi). By 
turning into a destructive machine, Enlightenment “mutilates people” (Ibid., 29) 
although it sets out to advance liberation and democracy. Konrad Paul Liessmann 
(2002, 50) formulates how Anders conceived of the negative dialectic: “It is precisely 
the triumphs of human beings that distance them from themselves, transcend the 
human measure and create the tendency that the human being disappears”50. 
Similar to Horkheimer and Adorno, Anders argued that the Enlightenment’s 
individualism and freedom backfired and turned the human being “into a screw in a 
machine of expansion that has been constructed by a minority”51 (Anders 2001, 277). 
                                            
46 Translation from German: „dann haben sie nämlich ihre Hemmungen gegenüber den 
Vernichtungswaffen ebenfalls vernichtet“. 
47 Translation from German: „die uns deshalb als ‚Störenfriede’ verleumden, weil wir ihre 
Friedensstörung stören“. 
48 General Paul Tibbits: Reflections on Hiroshima, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nuYBxpKIMwg (accessed on May 4, 2017). 
49 Ibid.  
50 Translation from German: „Es sind gerade die Triumphe des Menschen, die ihn von sich 
selbst entfernen, das menschliche Maß überschreiten und den Menschen tendenziell 
verschwinden lassen“. 
51 Translation from German: „zur Schraube innerhalb einer, von einer Minorität konstruierten, 
Expansionsmaschine“. 
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In Nazism, this screw “was allowed to carry the brand name of the ’master race’”52 
(Anders 2001, 277). For Anders, Auschwitz and Hiroshima were the consequences 
of carrying capitalism to the last instance. Anders adds to Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
analysis that the destructive potentials of technology are so big that capitalism’s last 
instance can turn into humanity’s final instance.  
The number of nuclear weapons has overall decreased in the past decades. At the 
time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the number was 29,150 (Norris and 
Kristensen 2010). At 69,368, the amount of nuclear weapons reached a historical 
high in 1986 (Norris and Kristensen 2010). In 2016, there were 15,395 nuclear 
weapons, controlled by nine countries (USA, Russia, UK, France, China, India, 
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea) (SIPRI 2016). But the nuclear arsenals are 
continuously updated, modernised and supported by re-investments, maintaining that 
the nuclear threat of human extinction will remain a reality for a long time.  
We are today seeing the development of a new dialectic of the Enlightenment that 
is spearheaded by figures such as Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, and Marine Le Pen. 
Neoliberalism advanced a narrow form of freedom focused on the freedom of the 
market and the freedom of private ownership. As a result, inequalities have risen and 
welfare states, and with them basic social protections, have been dismantled. 
Political agendas, including the social democratic agenda, have ignored the interest 
of the dominated class and declared class non-existent and a thing of the past. 
Neoliberal ideologues’ common argument is that the rise of a new middle class has 
eliminated traditional class society. But today we witness the return of the repressed 
class in negative forms. Neoliberalism’s contradiction between social freedom and 
market freedom backfired and created new authoritarian potentials, new 
nationalisms, and a heavily polarised political climate. Given that also some old 
authoritarians (e.g. in North Korea) control nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction, the clash of old and new authoritarianism increases the risk of 
humanity’s annihilation. Günther Anders’ warning that capitalism has catastrophic 
potentials remains highly topical today. As long as capitalism exists, we cannot rule 
out a crisis that produces fascism and new forms of annihilism.  
4.4. Heidegger 
In the years 1921-1924, Günther Anders studied philosophy at the University of 
Freiburg. His teachers included Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. Socialist 
theory was in the 1920s highly structuralist and mechanistic. Many thinkers assumed 
that capitalism would automatically collapse because of the tendency of the profit 
rate to fall and that socialism would automatically emanate from capitalism. In the 
world of social theory and philosophy, thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse and Günther 
Anders searched for alternatives that were oriented on concrete human praxis. In the 
1920s, both thought that Heidegger’s philosophy offered such an approach. When it 
became evident in the 1930s that the concrete political project that Heidegger 
supported was Nazism, Anders and Marcuse were among the scholars who turned 
against him and started realising the problematic elements in their former teacher’s 
philosophy. “Certainly, never before has a reactionary doctrine put on such 
subversive clothes”53 (Anders 2001, 28). 
                                            
52 Translation from German: „zu einer Schraube, die die Firmenmarke Herrenmensch tragen 
durfte“. 
53 Translation from German: „Gewiß, noch nie hat sich eine reaktionäre Lehre ein so 
umstürzlerisches Gewand angetan“ (Anders 2001, 28). 
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Anders (2001) characterises Heidegger’s philosophy as nihilistic existentialism 
because in it, “death is the lodestar of life and being is ‘being-toward-death’”54 
(Anders 2001, 49). For Heidegger, being is characterised by death and the 
circumstance that any concrete being (that Heidegger terms Da-sein) comes to its 
end: “Factically one's own Da-sein is always already dying, that is, it is in a being-
toward-its-end” (Heidegger 1996, 235). Anders also criticises that for Heidegger 
(2001, 202), not the human being, but Da-sein (being-there) is the subject.  
For Heidegger, most being-there is inauthentic: “Factically, Da-sein maintains itself 
initially and for the most part in an inauthentic being-toward-death” (Heidegger 1996, 
240). For Heidegger, being-there (Da-Sein, Seiendes) becomes authentic when one 
accepts the possibility of death so that death does not strike one as a surprise: 
“Authentic being-toward-death signifies an existentiell possibility of Da-sein” (240). 
“One's own potentiality-of-being becomes authentic and transparent in the 
understanding being-toward-death as the ownmost possibility” (283).  
Anders argues that Heidegger leaves out the analysis of where alienation (that 
Heidegger refers to as Das Man [the they] or Uneigentlickeit [inauthenticity]) comes 
from and simply posits it as a priori. Heidegger does not see that “the ‘they’ that is 
being supplied with principles, opinions and feelings in the commodity form, is 
‘inauthentic’ and ‘dispossessed’ of its own possibilities”55 (Anders 2001, 54). For 
Heideger,”the ‘they’ is not the result of a historical process, but an a priori ‘who of Da-
sein’”56 (Anders 2001, 55). Heidegger ignored “the social struggles of his time”57 
(Anders 2001, 61). The “real powers that be, are not worthwhile mentioning in 
Heidegger’s philosophy (Anders 1948, 354). Heidegger would not give attention to 
need, hunger, and capitalism: “For the fact however, that ‘Dasein’ is hungry, or, in 
more customary words, that men are hungry, we are looking in vain” (Anders 1948, 
346). Although Heidegger talks about Sorge (concern, care), he does not concern 
himself with the “’Sorge-tools’ of today, the economic systems, industry, machines” 
(347). According to Anders, also Heidegger’s concept of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) 
is pseudo-concrete: “State, economy, slavery, law – nothing of it is so much as 
mentioned in Heidegger’s philosophy of history. […] The fact that the major portion of 
history is history of power, thus history of the un-free, history imposed upon people, 
is totally suppressed” (360). 
Because of leaving out the political-economic context of society, Heidegger’s 
concept of being is “a hopelessly amputated existence that cannot give answers to 
the true questions, i.e. the true difficulties of our existence, because it does not ask 
them”58 (Anders 2001, 50). “The reality of industrialisation, democracy, the width of 
the contemporary world, and the working class did not enter his philosophy – 
because Heidegger is a provincial petty bourgeois” 59  (42-43). “It is already 
                                            
54 Translation from German: „[d]as Sterben wird zum Leitstern des Lebens, und das Dasein 
ein ‚Sein zum Tode’“. 
55 Translation from German: „das ‚man’, beliefert mit warenartigen Prinzipien, Meinungen und 
Gefühlen, seiner eigenen Möglichkeiten ‚enteignet’ ist“. 
56 Translation from German: „Denn für ihn ist das ‚man’ kein Ergebnis eines geschichtlichen 
Verlaufs, sondern ein apriorisches ‚Wer des Daseins’“. 
57 Translation from German: „die sozialen Kämpfe seiner Zeit“.  
58 Translation from German: „ein hoffnungslose amputiertes Dasein, das die wirklichen 
Fragen, d.h. die wirklichen Schwierigkeiten unseres Daseins schon deshalb nicht 
beantworten kann, weil es sie gar nicht fragt“. 
59 Translation from German: „Was nicht in seine Philosophie einging, war die Tatsache der 
Industrialisierung, der Demokratie, der Weite der heutigen Welt, der Arbeiterbewegung – 
denn Heidegger ist provinzieller Mittelständler“. 
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Heidegger’s fault that he only sees the ‘they’ as foil for the existence of the human 
being and that he does not see that it could be the task of the human being to create 
an authentic world that corresponds to the human being”60 (58). 
Günther Anders’ critique makes evident that Heidegger’s philosophy leaves a 
theoretical void, namely the question of how the alienation of society, alienated 
human activity, and alienated technologies are grounded. Whereas critical theorists 
such as Georg Lukács, Herbert Marcuse and Günther Anders himself see alienation 
based on Marx’s works grounded in class, capitalism and domination, these 
dimensions of heteronomous societies do not exist for Heidegger. Anders argues that 
this theoretical void made Heidegger unresisting to Nazi ideology. “Little wonder that 
he had no principle whatsoever, no social idea, in short: nothing, when the trumpet of 
National Socialism started blaring into his moral vacuum: he became a Nazi” (Anders 
1948, 356).  
The publication of Heidegger’s (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015) Black Notebooks 
shows that in his thought world, he filled the void by anti-Semitism (for a detailed 
discussion, see Fuchs 2015a, 2015b, Trawny 2016). For Heidegger, Jewishness is 
associated with instrumental reason: “Jewry’s temporary increase in power is, 
however, grounded in the fact that Western metaphysics, especially in its modern 
development, furnishes the starting point for the diffusion of a generally empty 
rationality and calculative ability, which in this way provides a refuge in ‘spirit’, without 
being able grasp the hidden decision regions on their own. The more originary and 
primordial the prospective decisions and questions, the more they remain 
inaccessible to this ‘race’” 61  (Heidegger 2014c, 46). Heidegger does not see 
instrumental reason as a principle of quantification associated with class rule and 
bureaucratic domination. Given that he filled his theoretical void with anti-Semitism, it 
is no surprise that Heidegger became a member of the Nazi-party.  
Anders (2001, 275, 70-71) sees parallels between Heidegger’s and Hitler’s 
thought, namely anti-humanism, anti-democratic affects, the doctrine of occupation, 
unscrupulousness, the metaphysics of death, and anti-civilising and anti-universalist 
ideology. “Both metaphysics simultaneously glorify and trivialise death. In Nazi 
metaphysics, this assumption takes on the form of education for war. War is seen as 
realising Germany’s authentic Da-sein: ‘We are born to die’. In existentialist 
philosophy, we find the transformation of death into ‘being-toward-death’ that 
                                            
60 Translation from German: „Aber daß Heidegger allein das ‚man’ als Folie für die Existenz 
des Menschen sieht; daß er nicht sieht, daß eine dem Menschen angemessene eigentliche 
Welt zu schaffen auch die Aufgabe des Menschen sein könnte – das ist eben bereits die 
Schuld Heideggers“ (Anders 2001, 58). 
61 Translation from German: „Die zeitweilige Machtsteigerung des Judentums aber hat darin 
ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des Abendlandes, zumal in ihrer neuzeitlichen Entfaltung, 
die Ansatzstelle bot für das Sichbreitmachen einer sonst leeren Rationalität und 
Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem Wege eine Unterkunft im ,Geist‘ verschaffte, ohne die 
verborgenen Entscheidungsbezirke von sich aus je fassen zu können. Je ursprünglicher und 
anfänglicher die künftigen Entscheidungen und Fragen werden, um so unzugänglicher 
bleiben sie dieser ,Rasse‘”.  
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allegedly is identical with authenticity”62 (70). “These parallels show that the model of 
becoming-authentic is in both cases very similar”63 (71). 
In contrast to Heidegger, Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave is according to 
Anders much more concrete than Heidegger’s philosophy (Anders 2001, 61). It does 
not conceive of existence as singularity, but as contradiction. “This is the reason why 
Hegel is still more topical than Heidegger. [...] Because the neutralisation of 
existence by positing Da-sein as singularity results in completely undialectical Da-
sein” 64  (61-62). “Being-without-dialectic” 65  (62) would be a characteristic of 
Heidegger’s philosophy. According to Anders, Marx in contrast to Heidegger in his 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and The German Ideology understands that 
the worker’s being is inauthentic because “as incarnated labour time, he is being-for-
another and being-owned-by-another”66.  
Pseudo-concreteness is for Günther Anders also a characteristic quality of 
Heidegger’s concept of technology. For Heidegger, “not by staring at a hammer do 
we know what it is, but by hammering. […] Are modern machines really ‘revealing’ 
themselves by their operation? Is their product their purpose? Is not their purpose to 
be seen only by making transparent much more than the machines themselves? […] 
Operating a modern machine, does not reveal it at all; its ‘alienation’ is obviously 
reckoned with in present-day society and its division of labor. […] that at the point 
where Heidegger seems to become ‘concrete’ or ‘pragmatic’, he is most obsolete, 
shows, so to speak, a machine-smashing attitude, for all his examples are taken from 
the provincial shoemaker workshop. The alienation produced precisely by those tools 
that are supposed to be revealing, is alien to him” (Anders 1948, 344). 
Anders argues that for Heidegger, the world is a Zeug-world (a world of things and 
equipment) with hammer, nails and petty-bourgeois babble, a world that “resembles 
the rural shoemaker’s workshop”67 (Anders 2001, 212). For Heidegger, technology is 
artisanal and agricultural (Anders 2001, 287). “He is not interested in machines”68 
(Anders 2001, 258). Heidegger does not take into account that technologies serve 
“the profit need of the class that owns the means of production”69 (Anders 2001, 213).  
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1996) mentions examples of Zeug, namely “writing, 
materials, pen, ink, paper, desk blotter, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room”, 
“hammering with the hammer,” (64). “The shoe to be produced is for wearing 
(footgear), the clock is made for telling time” (65). Heidegger’s analysis of technology 
is a romantic idealisation of pre-modern times, of a world without electricity that is 
                                            
62 Translation from German: „In beiden Metaphysiken wird der Tod zugleich verherrlicht und 
bagatellisiert; in der nationalsozialistischen durch Erziehung zum Kriege, der das eigentliche 
Dasein Deutschlands verwirkliche: ‚Wir sind zum Sterben geboren’; in der Existenz-
Philosophie durch Verwandlung des Todes in das angeblich mit dem Eigentlichsein 
identische ‚Sein zum Tode’“ (Anders 2001, 70). 
63 Translation from German: „Diese Parallelen zeigen, daß das Modell des Eigentlichwerdens 
in beiden Fällen sehr ähnlich ist“. 
64 Translation from German: „Deshalb ist Hegel noch immer aktueller als Heidegger. [...] 
Denn die Neutralisierung des Daseins im Singular hat zugleich zur Folge, daß das Dasein 
völlig undialektisch ist“. 
65 Translation from German: „Dialektiklosigkeit“. 
66 Translation from German: „weil er als fleischgewordene Arbeitszeit anderem Dasein zu 
eigen ist“. 
67 Translation from German: „der dörflichen Schusterwerkstatt ähnelt“. 
68 Translation from German: „Maschinen interessieren ihn nicht“. 
69 Translation from German: „dem Profitbedürfnis der die Produktionsmittel besitzenden 
Klasse“. 
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dominated by rural life, agriculture and toil. Anders’ analysis of technology in contrast 
engages with the technologies of his time in the context of capitalism and imperialism. 
Whereas Heidegger analyses technologies as such, Anders focuses on the mutual 
shaping of technologies and political economy. Anders therefore for example 
analyses television and radio in the context of capitalism and the atom bomb in the 
context of imperialism. Capitalism and imperialism do not exist in Heidegger’s 
philosophy or his analysis of technology. 
In those instances where Heidegger mentions modern technologies such as public 
transport and the newspaper, it becomes evident that he sees modernity and its 
technologies in general as inauthentic and “true dictatorship” (Heidegger 1996, 119). 
Heidegger’s notion of being as being-without-dialectic results in a one-dimensional 
notion of technology that does not see any contradictions in the relationship of 
society and technology.  
A truly Heideggerian analysis of the computer, the Internet, the digital and data 
rejects the computer as such. It disregards the potentials the computer has as a tool 
of co-ordination in a decentralised democratic socialist economy and society, and 
idealises handwriting, paper and pencils. But computing has in fact not outdated 
these technologies; rather, it has updated them. The computer brings a myriad of 
positive effects for the simplification of our everyday life. Problems emerge when 
instrumental reason shapes computing and society. When computing does not 
substitute, but supports human activities, then it can have humanising effects.  
5. Conclusion 
The philosophy of technology is very frequently associated with Martin Heidegger. 
The publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks has made evident that his concept 
of rationality has anti-Semitic characteristics. Günther Anders stressed in his analysis 
of Heidegger that such problems and weaknesses have to do with the pseudo-
concreteness of Heidegger’s approach that leaves behind a theoretical gap and is 
blind to political economy. 
Anders has in contrast and opposition to Heidegger elaborated a critical theory of 
technology. For Anders, technology is not simply a world of tools. Capitalism and 
imperialism are themselves world machines for the accumulation of capital and 
power that shape and are shaped by machines reciprocally. Anders allows us to 
critically analyse how the technological fetishism associated with the Promethean 
gap takes on new forms today, such as that of digital positivism, big data fetishism, or 
post-humanist ideology. 
In his analysis of commercial television and radio, Anders stresses aspects of 
labour, ideology and their alternatives. Today, the users of social media are what 
Anders termed homeworkers. Their use of platforms such as Google, YouTube and 
Facebook is digital labour that produces a big data commodity that is sold for 
enabling targeted advertising. The world of the Internet appears to have 
democratised communications, but it is today shaped by new power asymmetries in 
the online attention economy that features new forms of banalisation, unilateralism, 
di-vidualism, sensationalism, and anti-sensationalism. 
Anders stresses that the interaction between technology, capitalism and 
imperialism generates annihilatory potentials. Given that capitalism and imperialism 
continue to exist and today tend to take on authoritarian forms, what Anders termed 
annihilism (annihilatory nihilism) remains a constant threat. 
At the international level, Günther Anders’ work has thus far remained rather 
undiscovered, which has to do with the fact that his principal work Die Antiquiertheit 
tripleC 15(2): 584-613, 2017 611 
 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2017. 
 
 
des Menschen is yet to be published in English. Anders’ works reminds us that 
confronting the negative dialectics of contemporary society requires critical 
intellectuals and political praxis. 
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